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Since the end of the Second Sudanese civil war in 2005, movement across
the Uganda-South Sudan border has been commonplace, complicating
simplistic ideas about return and repatriation. New research among recent
refugees from this region shows that these movements still continue, and
are now ways in which refugees attempt to assert control over uncertain
and unpredictable lives.
This post is based on research from the project Deconstructing Notions of
Resilience at the LSE Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa.
Mobility has become an essential part of life for many South Sudanese over the last
several decades, especially since the end of the Second Sudanese War in 2005.
Most current South Sudanese refugees today result from the 2013 civil war, which
killed hundreds of thousands and displaced nearly four million. In fact, this war was
so brutal that by mid-2016, South Sudan was Africa’s greatest refugee crisis and the
third largest in the world.
Despite being refugees, South Sudanese in Uganda continue to engage in many
movements, both within and across Uganda’s borders. In our recent article
published through the Journal of Refugee Studies, we investigate some of the
journeys undertaken by refugees now living in Palabek Refugee Settlement in
northern Uganda. Based on 12 months  eldwork over 2017-18, our paper argues
that these movements are essential ways in which refugees attempt to take some
control over their uncertain and unpredictable lives. Further, by setting their
journeys within wider personal and regional historical perspectives, our paper
shows how the movements of South Sudanese refugees disrupt simplistic ideas
about return and repatriation.
Peace, proximity and cross-border mobility
Nearly all the South Sudanese we spoke with had been refugees at least once
before, some as many as three times. However, despite the violence in South
Sudan, many refugees also continued to move back and forth across the South
Sudan/Uganda border, as they had done throughout their lives. Their reasons for
these border crossings were diverse, re ecting long histories of mobility in this
region and showing a range of personal, familial and communal concerns.
Despite this, our  ndings suggest that a combination of the speci c location and
demographic composition of Palabek vis-à-vis South Sudan alongside regional
variation in South Sudan’s con ict dynamics were the primary factors allowing
these journeys to be undertaken. Thus, throughout our  eldwork, and although
much of the country was de nitely unsafe, one obvious difference between
refugees in Palabek and some other refugee receiving locations is that the majority
of refugees in Palabek originated from generally safe areas near the Ugandan
border. This combination of (relative) peace and proximity meant cross-border
mobility was at least possible, if neither predictable nor entirely normal.
Safety, security and the R-ARCSS peace process
Security concerns are therefore signi cant, as many refugees’ movements
depended upon the success of R-ARCSS (the Revitalised Agreement on the
Resolution of the Con ict in South Sudan), South Sudan’s current but fragile peace
process. Although several previous attempts to end the war had failed, more
positive feelings about the potential of R-ARCSS was shown by the fact that the
number of cross-border journeys increased substantially following the signing of R-
ARCSS in September 2018. Over the November 2018 to March 2019 dry season,
more people than ever returned to South Sudan. They went for longer periods, with
some staying for several months in order to prepare land in hope of future
cultivation.
Nonetheless, even the most active border crossers remained cautious about the
future. This was because of the signi cant risk attached; as everyone recognised,
the peace process was very fragile.
Fear of renewed violence, however, was not the only reason people stayed in
Uganda; they were also concerned about losing their refugee status, and the rights
and resources this status allowed. Given refugees’ very real fears about how they
might be affected by events beyond their immediate control, it is little wonder they
were reluctant to give up being a refugee. This is why people told us that permanent
return would be at least three and  ve years away and then only if R-ARCSS
continued to hold. Nonetheless, even in this circumstance, nearly everyone said
they would maintain their refugee status as long as possible, allowing a return to
Palabek should life in South Sudan prove too violent or di cult.
Corruption and its consequences
In the six months prior to R-ARCSS, however, cross-border movement had been
severely curtailed due to the fallout of a scandal involving the systematic in ation
of refugee numbers that rocked the Ugandan refugee industry. In response to this
scandal, UNHCR instituted the organisation’s largest ever biometric registration and
veri cation programme between March and September 2018. This sought to
quantify the true number of Ugandan-based refugees, reducing the possibility of
corruption and theft, and tying the allocation and distribution of all humanitarian
assistance to the  nal outcome.
One result was a series of changes in how food was processed, distributed and
accounted for. In Palabek, this meant that from June 2018, camp authorities began
insisting refugees could only collect food aid from a single speci ed point on one
particular day per month. As well as an irregularity in distribution days – it could be
the start of the month during one cycle but the end or middle during another; food
collection was suddenly now only available to persons older than 14 who could
provide valid biometric data on a speci c day, usually publicised less than a week
before delivery began.
Because of these changes, friends, kin or refugee leaders could no longer collect
food for absentees, as they had been able to under the previous system. Although
more accountable, the new system not only had a negative effect on those who had
not correctly registered (most of whom now lost all access to food and other
humanitarian services) but also on refugees’ wider movements undertaken across
the border and within Uganda, signi cantly limiting refugees’ legally-entitled
freedom of movement.
Class dimensions in Palabek Refugee Settlement
As in any community, some refugees in Palabek travel more frequently or for longer
periods than others, and these differences demonstrate obvious class dimensions.
For Palabek residents before the 2018 biometric veri cation exercise, especially,
cross-border movement was de nitely more common among those located at the
extremes of the class spectrum and had distinctive class pro les.
On the one hand, while some refugees are involved in international business and
have dependable access to vehicular transport and a variety of sought after trade
goods, most move out of sheer desperation, their mobility induced by uncertainties
around service provision and resource availability; for many of the more
marginalised, life in the settlement had simply become too fragile to bear. Generally
this was because, despite the prima facie refugee status to which all South
Sudanese in Uganda are entitled, for various reasons they had either failed or could
not afford the bribe money necessary to o cially register as a refugee. Therefore,
unable to afford life in the settlement and without any access to food, health
services or other humanitarian assistance, desperation drove them back to the
uncertainties of South Sudan.
At least until biometric registration stabilised humanitarian assistance from April
2018, a lack of dependable food provision was the single greatest concern of most
Palabek refugees. Although regular distribution of food seemed to be an assumed
fact by most humanitarian actors, it certainly was not taken for granted by refugees.
In fact, missing or delayed food aid was a de ning feature of settlement life over
2017-18, and we were repeatedly told it was the single main reason someone would
leave the relative safety of Uganda and return to uncertainty and danger in South
Sudan. We were shown multiple abandoned compounds whose owners had been
among those denied food by humanitarian corruption. Because they could not
afford the requested bribes, these refugees had concluded their best chance of
survival was to leave the refugee settlement – in which they had no means of
obtaining food or health services – and return to try to scrape out a subsistence-
agriculture-based life-on-the-edge in a country beset by violence.
Several empirically-based conclusions and recommendations follow from our
research:
Firstly, the contemporary cross-border mobilities of Palabek refugees are
connected to refugees’ experiences of life in Uganda and the unique location of the
settlement vis-a-vis South Sudan. This means:
• Mobility patterns found may be somewhat unique and certainly should not be
expected to be repeated elsewhere, especially if the basic dimensions of relative
peace and proximity are absent.
• The ways in which refugees speak about and practice returns to and from South
Sudan are largely framed through the negative experiences of life in exile. Return
movement should not therefore be con ated with voluntary repatriation.
• Most of those who did repatriate did so because humanitarian corruption made it
di cult to access the basic food aid to which they were entitled, not because they
speci cally wanted to ‘return home’ at that precise moment.
Secondly, along with the di culties of settlement life, other important parameters
affecting cross-border mobility were localised development and national peace and
security initiatives. This means:
• Future repatriation depends on local development as much as peace and,
without signi cant localised rural investment, might ultimately prove unsustainable.
• The international community remains important to South Sudan’s linked
development and peacebuilding efforts. International resources should therefore be
directed not only towards the provision of security and high-level political elites, but
also towards infrastructure development in poverty-stricken, war-affected rural
areas.
Read the full paper in the Journal of Refugee Studies here. 
See the research in cartoon as part of the CPAID Comics series here.
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